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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

GARY L. WELBORN,

:

Petitioner / Appellant,
v.

:

UTAH BOARD OF PARDONS, et al.,

:

Respondents / Appellees.

:

Case No. 20090720-CA

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS / APPELLEES

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This action comes within the original jurisdiction of the Utah Supreme Court under
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)(I) (West 2009). It was transferred to this Court on
October 5,2009, pursuant to Rule 42(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1. Did the Board of Pardons' decision to give Welborn a June 2014 rehearing date
violate petitioner's constitutional rights by: the procedure that it used; an error made by
its hearing officer, but not the board, as to how many convictions the petitioner had; use
of information from Welborn's Presentence Investigation Report in making its decision;
and failure to follow sentencing guidelines in reaching its decision?
ISSUE PRESERVED BELOW. This issue was raised in the respondents'
motion for summary judgment. R. 151 -23 7.

1

STANDARD OF REVIEW: The legal reasoning of a court granting an
extraordinary writ is reviewed for correctness. Rice v. Pi v. of Securities. 2004 UT App
2l5,1f4,95P.3d 1169.
2. Based on a copy he received of the district court's computerized docket, which
showed the wrong date for when respondents were mailed a copy of Welborn's petition,
petitioner claimed the respondents' motion for summary judgment should be stricken as
being untimely filed. Did the district court abuse its discretion in denying petitioner's
motion to strike?
ISSUE PRESERVED BELOW. This issue was raised by the petitioner's motion
to strike and the board's response thereto. R. 254, 323-24. A motion to strike pleadings
is addressed to the discretion of the court and will only be overturned by a clear abuse of
that discretion. Pratt v. Nelson, 2005 UT App 541, ^[9, 127 P.3d 1256, remanded on other
grounds. Pratt v. Nelson. 2007 UT 41, 164 P.3d 366.
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The district court's ruling on a motion to strike is
reviewed for abuse of discretion.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
All such provisions are set forth verbatim in Addendum A to this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Gary Welborn filed this petition for extraordinary relief on November 10,2008.
R. 1-126. Welborn raised five issues in his petition.
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(1) Respondents relied upon incorrect information in reaching a decision
regarding [Petitioner's] parole date; (2) the rehearing date Respondents set
for Petitioner was unduly long considering the actual facts of the case; (3) it
was error for Respondent to refuse to accept evidence from Petitioner but
then to allow the victim to present testimony; (4) the hearing officer failed
to review Petitioner's file appropriately which lead [sic] him to believe that
Petitioner did not accept full responsibility for his crimes; and (5) due to
State budget cuts, it will take longer than appropriate for Petitioner to
receive sex offender treatment.
R. 140 (Minute Entry filed April 24, 2009) (a copy is attached as Addendum B).
The district court ordered the Attorney General's Office to respond to the first four
issues raised by the petition, but dismissed the fifth claim as being frivolous on its face.
R# 140-42. On June 8, 2009, the Utah Board of Pardons and its individual members
responded to the petition by filing a motion for summary judgment. R. 151-237.
Welborn moved to strike this motion as being untimely. R. 254. The district court denied
the motion to strike and granted the motion for summary judgment on August 11, 2009.
R. 342-49 (a copy is attached as Addendum C). Welborn filed his notice of appeal on
August 28, 2009. R. 350-51.

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
Gary Welborn pled guilty to two felonies, aggravated sexual abuse of a child, a
first degree felony, and sexual abuse of a child, a second degree felony. He was
sentenced on July 14, 2004, to two concurrent terms, one of five years to life and the
other of one to fifteen years. R. 166-67. The Utah Board of Pardons scheduled
Welborn's original parole hearing for July 26, 2007. Petitioner received notice of the
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hearing and a copy of the records the board would rely on before the hearing. R. 170,
175-76.
Welborn appeared at the hearing, conducted by Hearing Officer Dick Sullivan, and
spoke on his own behalf. R. 173-205. Petitioner's victim was also present and permitted
to testify. R. 194-98. While Welborn had been permitted to submit various documents to
be considered by the board (R. 192-93) he was not allowed to submit evidence that
challenged the accuracy of the Presentence Investigation Report (PSI) that had been
prepared for use in Welbom's criminal sentencing. R. 186-90.
[Sullivan:] I characterize the sexual abuse the way it was characterized in
the Adult Probation and Parole presentence investigation report. I didn't
just pull that out of the air. And the Adult Probation and Parole, PSI was
based upon the detective's interview with your daughter and so forth, and
statements that were made, okay? So you've heard my characterization of
it. You do want to tell me where you disagree with me, is that right?
[Welborn] A: No, I don't disagree with you.
R. 190. The information contained in the PSI supports the hearing officer's statements as
to what occurred between Welborn and his victim. R. 219-34.
At the hearing, the hearing officer mistakenly believed that Welborn had pled
guilty to two first degree felonies and one second degree felony. R. 176-80. Even though
he believed that petitioner had been convicted of an additional felony, the hearing officer
informed Welborn that his recommendation to the board would be that petitioner be given
a December 2010 rehearing date. R. 202-3.
The board did not follow the hearing officer's recommendation. Instead, it
scheduled Welborn's rehearing for June 2014. R. 172. In doing so, the board accurately
4

stated that petitioner had been sentenced for one first degree and one second degree
felony. Id In explaining the rationale for its decision, the board listed eight aggravating
factors and stated that it found no mitigating ones. R. 237. The Chairman of the board,
Curtis Garner, testified that the board "did not base any part of its decision on the
assumption that Mr. Welborn had two life sentences and one indeterminate term of one to
fifteen years." R. 216.
On July 28, 2008, pursuant to Welborn's request for a Special Attention Review,
the board ordered that there be no change to the scheduled rehearing date of June 2014.
R. 208. In explaining its decision, the board noted that its calculations concerning the
petitioner were correct "[djespite any perceived mistakes by the Hearing Officer's
comments at the hearing regarding actual sentences served" and that the PSI contained
Welborn's admission as to the facts that he now sought to challenge. Id.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Petitioner brought this action against the board and its members, asking the courts
to overturn the board's original parole decision that set a rehearing date for Welborn of
June 2014.
No constitutional right of the petitioner was violated by the board's decision.
Welborn has a limited due process right to be given notice of the date of his original
parole hearing and access to the material that will be considered by the board at the
hearing. Petitioner acknowledged verbally and in writing that he had received this due
process. Nor was the board's decision arbitrary or capricious. The rehearing date is
5

within the applicable indeterminate sentence range and Welborn failed to show any
unusual circumstances that would make it inappropriate.
The record does show that the board's hearing officer misunderstood how many
convictions Welborn had. But the respondents presented evidence that the board did not
share this misunderstanding. The board's decision was based on accurate information
and not on any mistake made by the hearing officer. Welborn did not present any
evidence to the contrary.
The board based its decision on Welborn's whole record, including information
contained in the petitioner's PSI. Welborn claimed that the PSI information was
erroneous. Petitioner should have brought this claim at his criminal sentencing. His
failure to do so acted as a waiver of his right to challenge the PSI.
Petitioner claimed that the board failed to follow the proper sentencing guidelines
in making its parole decision. But such guidelines do not have the force of law and do
not curtail the discretion of the board.
Finally, Welborn argues that the respondents' motion for summary judgment was
untimely. This claim is based on an erroneous date shown on a copy of the district
court's computerized docket that was mailed to the petitioner. The date's importance
comes from the district court's order that gave the board thirty days from the service upon
it of a copy of the petition to respond. The docket was later corrected by the court to
show the actual date on which a copy of the petition was mailed to respondents. Using
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t|ie c o r r e c t

date9 the respondents9 motion for summary judgment w;i bind) hied and

petitioner's motion to strike was properly denied
ARGUMENT
I. THE BOARD OF PARDON'S DECISION DID NOT VIOLATE
ANY RIGHT OF THE PETITIONER
Welborn claims that his constitutional i i^Iit;. wi>«« ^ \ i «t» . i in the manner in which
the board held his uiiiiai fiarolc hearing, Petitioner bases this claim on his belief that the
;

d i .s *. •

uld have performed a fuller review of not just the procedure used by 11 K

board, but its substantive decision.
Utah law mandates that I maul dt t r*i< »"• I» .rmrded great deference and, as a
general mlc, hoard divisions are not subject to judicial review. Walker v. State, 902 ' •
] I ^ 150 (Utah App. 1995). Indeed, the board has exclusive authority to ikltinn
actual number of years a defendant is to serve neece \. iiwuse, 886 P.2d 508, 512 (Utah
1994)(citations omitio,
;

sit as a panel of review on the result, absent

T stitutional claim." Lancaster v. Utah Bd. of Pardons. 869 F

: -

7

(Utah 1994).
Only two limited exccpliiMiN ;illo i " lr i (iidicial review of Board decisions: 1) lo
assure Mutt pnvuliiial dur process was not denied, Labrum v. Utah State Bd. of Pardons,
870 P.2d 902 (Utah 1993) and 2) where there has been a clear HUIM. of id ,» n in •<• \\ aid
v. Smith, 573 P.2d 781, 7K2 (I Hah IV;M J.I. II» ...t i - • irv .iJdresses "the fairness of the
process by which llv MOJO i 'iiidnlakes its sentencing function," not the result. Padilla v.
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Utah Bd. of Pardons & Parole, 947 P.2d 664, 667 (Utah 1997) (citations omitted).
"[T]wo due process requirements must be met in parole grant hearings. First, an inmate
must receive adequate notice to prepare for a parole hearing. Second, an inmate must
receive copies or a summary of the information in the Board's file upon which the Board
will rely in deciding whether to grant parole." Peterson v. Utah Bd. of Pardons. 931 P.2d
147, 150 (Utah App. 1997) (citations omitted).
It is undisputed that Welborn's procedural due process rights wrere not violated.
He acknowledged that he had been given notice of the hearing and had received the
documents the board would consider. R. 170, 175-76.
Nor has Welborn shown that the board abused its discretion in setting a June, 2014
rehearing date. That this is longer than he would have desired does not make it
unconstitutional.
[S]o long as the period of incarceration decided upon by the board of
pardons falls within an inmate's applicable indeterminate range, e.g., five
years to life, then that decision, absent unusual circumstances, cannot be
arbitrary and capricious.
Preece, 886P.2dat 512.
Welborn's rehearing date is within the applicable indeterminate sentencing range.
He did not present to the district court any unusual circumstances that would make the
board's decision arbitrary and capricious. The district court correctly rejected this claim.

8

u. jLiii. UNDISPUTED EVIDENCE SHOWED THAT THE BUAKD
DID NOT MAKE ITS DECISION BASED ON A MISTAKE OF FACT
AS TO THE PETITIONER'S CONVICTIONS
The hearing officer

parole hearing misstated the number of

conviilton*» idr? 1 v 111 r petitioner's incarceration. Petitioner claimed that this error
invalidated the board's decision. But the hearing officer's error does in»! - »< ^ n,,,i iiierc
is a question of material fact as to whctlio (lit hniinl ivlml«>n u similar misconception in
making its parole < iei is11>ii,
Tlir *lisii'ict court aptly noted that the board's ultimate decision rested on ilit mil
record and not on the mere misstatements of the hearing o II vi i

lm The hearing

officer conducts the hearing tnut «ii;tL"\ n nr< »minundation to the board. The board is
chargeu
(

.-J ultimate parole decision. Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-5(1 )(a)

:• *•• " »o \ Utah Admin. Code R.671-305-1 (2009).
The respondents presented evidenu ili.it (lie biurd1'- decision was not based on an

assumptior

..

< h vw<
convictions I-

* •

uivicted of two first degree felonies and one second

ihe actual decision of the board correctly stated petitioner's ci iiiiiniil
~~ The special attention,m\ iev I il

the hearing office, ;

ird's decision, iv. _Ji

J« d that any mistake by
The board's chairman

iv u\)\ i! ilii.nl tlir board did not base any part of its decision concerning Welborn on a
mistaken belief that he had been convicted of an extra first degree
Indeed, the board did not accept tru . . .

•* •• >mmendation, but reached its

own decision. t< '"/ u,',
9

The moving party has the burden of presenting evidence to demonstrate that
no genuine issue of material facts exists and that judgment as a matter of
law is proper. However, once the moving party challenges an element of the
nonmoving party's case on the basis that no genuine issue of material fact
exists, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to present evidence
that is sufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact.
Waddoups v. Amalgamated Sugar Co.. 2002 UT 69, f31, 54 P.3d 1054 (citations
omitted). The respondents met their burden. They presented evidence that the hearing
officer's error had not affected the board's decision. Having done so, the burden then
shifted to Welborn to present evidence that demonstrated the existence of a genuine
material issue of fact. That petitioner failed to do. No evidence was presented that would
show the board's decision was based on the hearing officer's mistake. The district court
correctly determined that the undisputed facts did not support the petitioner's claim.
III. A RULE 65B PETITION CANNOT BE USED TO CHALLENGE
THE ACCURACY OF THE PETITIONER'S PSI
At his original parole hearing, the hearing officer and the board used information
contained in Welborn's PSI to ascertain the facts surrounding the petitioner's convictions.
Welborn was not permitted to challenge the accuracy of the PSI. By statute, Welborn had
the duty to challenge any inaccuracies in the PSI at the time of sentencing. Utah Code
Ann. § 77-18-l(6)(a) (West 2009). His failure to do so constituted a waiver of his right to
challenge this information later. Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(6)(b) (West 2009); State v.
Johnson, 2006 UT App 3, f 13, 129 P.3d 282 (challenges to information contained in the
PSI must be made at sentencing if they are to be preserved for appellate review).
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The statute require, tli.il flu initnii thy \ < mil determine the accuracy of
111 n)n ija 11< >n i >" 11(;11111,11 111 ni lir (' *<l. fhe board was entitled to rely upon this information
was not required to permit Welborn to challenge the PSI where he had waived any
such right and failed to preserve the claim at his criminal senlenunj 1
explicitly permitted

I hv hi rinl r ,

ligibility for parole on an inmate's

"enmeiiiitf pisl hHtorv." Labrum v. Utah State Bd. of Pardons. 870 P.2d 902. 908-09
(Utah 1993). Indeed, administrative proceedings before the board are H •..

;

I

the board is allowed to consider charges un nlm li ilir |nr<nm I ht\ hivn acquitted. Johns
v. Shulsen. ,'I " I" M I ! W, I VV7 IS (Utah 1986) (board was not barred h\ ..nmma •
acquittal from revoking inmate's parole upon its administrative finding that the inmate
had committed the underlying crime).
The district. M„„„| , n m r t h \h Id Hi.il 11 •« hunrd was free to consider the entirety of
the pelII h fiu'i "s record in.making its parole decision.
Petitioner's objection to the Board considering his pre-sentence
report is also unfounded. It is not for the Court to evaluate the content of
this report, but only to affirm that the pre-sentence report constitutes a
portion of petitioner's record and is a fair basis from which to glean
information about petitioner.
R. 347.
The district court correctly dismisst
summarily .IH'IHIH d.

should be

IV. SENTENCING GUIDELINES DO NOT HAVE THE FORCE OF
LAW
Welborn claims that the board's decision is invalid because it was longer than the
term of incarceration that was proposed by certain sentencing guidelines. But petitioner
had no protected interest in the board following any particular guidelines in considering
his eligibility for parole. The Utah Supreme Court rejected a similar claim in Monson v.
Carver, 928 P.2d 1017, 1023 (Utah 1996).
We reject these contentions insofar as they are premised on the
concept that the Guidelines create a liberty interest or an "expectation of
release" such that the Board's departure from them could amount to cruel
and unusual punishment. We have previously said that "any 'expectation of
release1 derived from the [Guidelines is at best tenuous" because they do
not have the force and effect of law. . . . If we were to credit Monson's
argument that the Board's departure from the Guidelines in his and other
cases amounts to the imposition of an excessive punishment, we would, in
effect, transform Utah's indeterminate sentencing scheme into a scheme of
determinate sentences fixed by the Guidelines. This we refuse to do. "[S]o
long as the period of incarceration decided upon by the board of pardons
falls within an inmate's applicable indeterminate range,. . . then that
decision, absent unusual circumstances, cannot be arbitrary and capricious."
Preece, 886P.2dat 512.
The board was not bound by any sentencing guidelines in reaching its decision
concerning the petitioner. It gave Welborn the necessary procedural due process. It
based its decision on the full record before it. The board's decision fell within the
indeterminate range set by Welborn's criminal sentence. The Parole Board's decision
did not violate the petitioner's rights. It was not excessive. The district court correctly
dismissed this claim and that decision should be affirmed on appeal.
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V. T H E D I S T R I C T C O U R T CORREI 11 \ I lENIED W E L R O R N ' S
M O T I O N T O STRIKE
I

( .'i. k'l ' I \ pnl M ?l Ml°, the district court gave the board thirty days after

service of the petition to respond. Based on a copy of the district court's docket (R. 336)
that he had received, Welborn believed that the court had mailed tin- icsp< indents a i n] \y
of the petition on April *1S, 2(ni{

I riiiiniirr nmvi'il tw « n ike the respondents' motion for

siiminun |ndgmrn» as being untimely.
But the docket provided to Welborn "was incorrect. '1 'he docket was later corrected
to show that the court did not mail a copv o

.

2(1(1*/. Au»[i") u»l IIK Joekel is nll.'irhcd hereto as Addendum D. 1 "Hie district court held
that the respondents"' motion was timely using the correct date of service. R. 344.
Welborn's motion to strike was based on an error in ilie * mnpuiu i -'i »l dnu mi i i m i
docket. Utah court "MU MH [H«\\H
(" (11 T i r • 11 m i s I j I Is c •.';

N<

> n r l ' r l m m l errors. Utah R. Civ. P. 60(a)

ni n y be corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or

on the motion of any party"). The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure also require m,
to "disregard any error or delect in ihe pmnviliiij.! uh In <l< r intl I "I • * * ( (! c substantial
riyhl-i il Hit" piiities " Illjth R Civ. P. 61.
In this case, the court justifiably relied on the docket date under which the
respondents' motion was timely. > .»• court was free iu dv leyiud im n u n n I he ilnclul

1

This Court can take judicial notice of the trial court's corrected docket. In Re
F.M., 2002 UT App 340, p n.2, 57 P.3d 1130 (court can take judicial notice of records
and prior proceedings in the same case).
13

records once it had been corrected because it did not prejudice the petitioner. Even if
Welborn's Motion to Strike were granted, Rule 55(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure would have precluded the entry of a default judgment against the respondents.
"No judgment by default shall be entered against the state of Utah or against any officer
or agency thereof unless the claimant establishes his claim or right to relief by evidence
satisfactory to the court." The district court correctly dismissed Welbom's petition on the
merits. Petitioner could not have established his claim to the satisfaction of the court
even if his motion had been granted. Because Welborn could not have prevailed, his
motion was properly denied and that decision should be affirmed on appeal.
CONCLUSION
For the above stated reasons, respondents ask this Court to affirm the dismissal of
this action.
Respectfully submitted this /&'

day of February, 2010.

BRENT A. BURNETT
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Respondents / Appellees
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I

< i- ••• :

mat I mailed two true and exact copies of the foregoing Brief of

Respondents / Appellees, postage prepaid, to the following on this /"&
February, 2010:
Gary L. Welbom
Inmate #162157
Central Utah Correctional Facility
P.O. Box 550
Gunnison, Utah 84634-0550
Petitioner / Appellant Pro Se

A
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ADDENDUM "A

Rule 65B. Extraordinary relief.
(a) Availability of remedy. Where no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy is available, a
person may petition the court for extraordinary relief on any of the grounds set forth in paragraph
(b) (involving wrongful restraint on personal liberty), paragraph (c) (involving the wrongful use
of public or corporate authority) or paragraph (d) (involving the wrongful use of judicial
authority, the failure to exercise such authority, and actions by the Board of Pardons and Parole).
There shall be no special form of writ. Except for instances governed by Rule 65C, the
procedures in this rule shall govern proceedings on all petitions for extraordinary relief. To the
extent that this rule does not provide special procedures, proceedings on petitions for
extraordinary relief shall be governed by the procedures set forth elsewhere in these rules.
(b) Wrongful restraints on personal liberty.
(b)(1) Scope. Except for instances governed by Rule 65C, this paragraph shall govern all
petitions claiming that a person has been wrongfully restrained of personal liberty, and the court
may grant relief appropriate under this paragraph.
(b)(2) Commencement. The proceeding shall be commenced by filing a petition with the clerk of
the court in the district in which the petitioner is restrained or the respondent resides or in which
the alleged restraint is occurring.
(b)(3) Contents of the petition and attachments. The petition shall contain a short, plain statement
of the facts on the basis of which the petitioner seeks relief. It shall identify the respondent and
the place where the person is restrained. It shall state the cause or pretense of the restraint, if
known by the petitioner. It shall state whether the legality of the restraint has already been
adjudicated in a prior proceeding and, if so, the reasons for the denial of relief in the prior
proceeding. The petitioner shall attach to the petition any legal process available to the petitioner
that resulted in restraint. The petitioner shall also attach to the petition a copy of the pleadings
filed by the petitioner in any prior proceeding that adjudicated the legality of the restraint.
(b)(4) Memorandum of authorities. The petitioner shall not set forth argument or citations or
discuss authorities in the petition, but these may be set out in a separate memorandum, two
copies of which shall be filed with the petition.
(b)(5) Dismissal of frivolous claims. On review of the petition, if it is apparent to the court that
the legality of the restraint has already been adjudicated in a prior proceeding, or if for any other
reason any claim in the petition shall appear frivolous on its face, the court shall forthwith issue
an order dismissing the claim, stating that the claim is frivolous on its face and the reasons for
this conclusion. The order need not state findings of fact or conclusions of law. The order shall
be sent by mail to the petitioner. Proceedings on the claim shall terminate with the entry of the
order of dismissal.
(b)(6) Responsive pleadings. If the petition is not dismissed as being frivolous on its face, the
court shall direct the clerk of the court to serve a copy of the petition and a copy of any
memorandum upon the respondent by mail. At the same time, the court may issue an order

directing the respondent to answer or otherwise respond to the petition, specifying a time within
which the respondent must comply. If the circumstances require, the court may also issue an
order directing the respondent to appear before the court for a hearing on the legality of the
restraint. An answer to a petition shall state plainly whether the respondent has restrained the
person alleged to have been restrained, whether the person so restrained has been transferred to
any other person, and if so, the identity of the transferee, the date of the transfer, and the reason
or authority for the transfer. Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to prohibit the court
from ruling upon the petition based upon a dispositive motion.
(b)(7) Temporary relief. If it appears that the person alleged to be restrained will be removed
from the court's jurisdiction or will suffer irreparable injury before compliance with the hearing
order can be enforced, the court shall issue a warrant directing the sheriff to bring the respondent
before the court to be dealt with according to law. Pending a determination of the petition, the
court may place the person alleged to have been restrained in the custody of such other persons
as may be appropriate.
(b)(8) Alternative service of the hearing order. If the respondent cannot be found, or if it appears
that a person other than the respondent has custody of the person alleged to be restrained, the
hearing order and any other process issued by the court may be served on the person having
custody in the manner and with the same effect as if that person had been naimed as respondent
in the action.
(b)(9) Avoidance of service by respondent. If anyone having custody of the person alleged to be
restrained avoids service of the hearing order or attempts wrongfully to remove the person from
the court's jurisdiction, the sheriff shall immediately arrest the responsible person. The sheriff
shall forthwith bring the person arrested before the court to be dealt with according to law.
(b)(10) Hearing or other proceedings. In the event that the court orders a hearing, the court shall
hear the matter in a summary fashion and shall render judgment accordingly. The respondent or
other person having custody shall appear with the person alleged to be restrained or shall state
the reasons for failing to do so. The court may nevertheless direct the respondent to bring before
it the person alleged to be restrained. If the petitioner waives the right to be present at the
hearing, the court shall modify the hearing order accordingly. The hearing order shall not be
disobeyed for any defect of form or any misdescription in the order or the pelition, if enough is
stated to impart the meaning and intent of the proceeding to the respondent.
(c) Wrongful use of or failure to exercise public authority.
(c)(1) Who may petition the court; security. The attorney general may, and when directed to do
so by the governor shall, petition the court for relief on the grounds enumerated in this
paragraph. Any person who is not required to be represented by the attorney general and who is
aggrieved or threatened by one of the acts enumerated in subparagraph (2) of this paragraph may
petition the court under this paragraph if (A) the person claims to be entitled to an office
unlawfully held by another or (B) if the attorney general fails to file a petition under this
paragraph after receiving notice of the person's claim. A petition filed by a person other than the
attorney general under this paragraph shall be brought in the name of the petitioner, and the

petition shall be accompanied by an undertaking with sufficient sureties to pay any judgment for
costs and damages that may be recovered against the petitioner in the proceeding. The sureties
shall be in the form for bonds on appeal provided for in Rule 73.
(c)(2) Grounds for relief. Appropriate relief may be granted: (A) where a person usurps, intrudes
into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office, whether civil or military, a franchise, or an
office in a corporation created by the authority of the state of Utah; (B) where a public officer
does or permits any act that results in a forfeiture of the office; (C) where persons act as a
corporation in the state of Utah without being legally incorporated; (D) where any corporation
has violated the laws of the state of Utah relating to the creation, alteration or renewal of
corporations; or (E) where any corporation has forfeited or misused its corporate rights,
privileges or franchises.
(c)(3) Proceedings on the petition. On the filing of a petition, the court may require that notice be
given to adverse parties before issuing a hearing order, or may issue a hearing order requiring the
adverse party to appear at the hearing on the merits. The court may also grant temporary relief in
accordance with the terms of Rule 65 A.
(d) Wrongful use of judicial authority or failure to comply with duty; actions by board of
pardons and parole.
(d)(1) Who may petition. A person aggrieved or whose interests are threatened by any of the acts
enumerated in this paragraph may petition the court for relief.
(d)(2) Grounds for relief. Appropriate relief may be granted: (A) where an inferior court,
administrative agency, or officer exercising judicial functions has exceeded its jurisdiction or
abused its discretion; (B) where an inferior court, administrative agency, corporation or person
has failed to perform an act required by law as a duty of office, trust or station; (C) where an
inferior court, administrative agency, corporation or person has refused the petitioner the use or
enjoyment of a right or office to which the petitioner is entitled; or (D) where the Board of
Pardons and Parole has exceeded its jurisdiction or failed to perform an act required by
constitutional or statutory law.
(d)(3) Proceedings on the petition. On the filing of a petition, the court may require that notice be
given to adverse parties before issuing a hearing order, or may issue a hearing order requiring the
adverse party to appear at the hearing on the merits. The court may direct the inferior court,
administrative agency, officer, corporation or other person named as respondent to deliver to the
court a transcript or other record of the proceedings. The court may also grant temporary relief in
accordance with the terms of Rule 65 A.
(d)(4) Scope of review. Where the challenged proceedings are judicial in nature, the court's
review shall not extend further than to determine whether the respondent has regularly pursued
its authority.
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURTBy.
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
]ARY L. WELBORN,

MINUTE ENTRY

Petitioner,

Case No. 080923667

Deputy Clerk

Judge Sheila K. McCleve

JTAH BOARD OF PARDONS AND PAROLE,
*. al,

Date: April 20, 2009

Respondents.

This matter is before the Court on the Petition for Extraordinary Relief, pursuant to Utah Rule of
Civil Procedure 65B(d).'
Petitioner raises five, interrelated, causes of action. They are: (1) Respondents relied upon incorrect
information in reaching a decision regarding Defendant's parole date; (2) the rehearing date Respondents
set for Petitioner was unduly long considering the actual facts of the case; (3) it was error for Respondent
to refuse to accept evidence from Petitioner but then to allow the victim to present testimony; (4) the hearing
officer failed to review Petitioner's file appropriately which lead him to believe that Petitioner did not
accept full responsibility for his crimes; and (5) due to State budget cuts, it will take longer than appropriate
for Petitioner to receive sex offender treatment.
The Court first reviews the Petition to determine if "the legality of the restraint has already been
adjudicated in a prior proceeding, or if for any other reason any claim in the petition... appear[s] frivolous
on its." Rule 65B(b)(5). In evaluating whether the Petitioner's claims are frivolous, the Court must
consider the authority it has to review Board of Pardon's actions. The Court generally has no authority to
review the many of the Board's substantive decisions. "[S]o long as the period of incarceration decided upon
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by the board of pardons falls within an inmate's applicable indeterminate range,..., then that decision,
absent unusual circumstances, cannot be arbitrary and capricious." Preece v. House, 896 P.2d 508 512
(Utah 1994) (citations omitted). However, the Court does have authority to review the "process by which
the Board undertakes its sentencing function." Id. (quotations and citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
The Court finds that Petitioner's first four causes of action state claims that appropriately challenge
the process by which the Board undertook its sentencing function. Although the second cause of action
challenges the review date Petitioner was given, the challenge is based upon alleged procedural errors.
Therefore, the first four causes of action are not dismissed. A copy of the Petition will be served upon
Respondents and they shall have thirty (30) days to respond.
Petitioner's remaining claim alleges that budgetary cutbacks will prevent him from timely receiving
sex offender treatment. The Court finds that this claim must be dismissed. First, this claim does not allege
a wrong committed by the Respondents, the Board of Pardons and its members, and the Respondents cannot
answer the claim. Second, the prison's budget is a matter for the legislature and not for the Court.
For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner's first, second, third, and fourth claims are not frivolous and
warrant response from Respondents. Upon receiving the Petition, Respondents shall have thirty (30) days
to respond to claims one through four. Petitioner's fifth claim is dismissed as frivolous on its face.

DATED this^day of April, 2009.

<u*^u C t & A
fudg£"Sheila K. McCleve
District Court Judge

MAILING CERTIFICATE

I certify that a copy of the Minute Entry was sent to the following, by the following
method on the 28th day of April, 2009.

Method

Name

Mail:

Gary Welborn
Inmate # 33639
Housing Unit C-3
Central Utah Correctional Facility
PO Box 550
Gunnison, Utah 84634-0550

Dated this the 28* day of April, 2009.

Deputy Court (Merle
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
GARY WELBORN.
ORDER ON MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Petitioner,
v.

Case No. 080923667
UTAH STATE BOARD OF PARDONS,
Judge Robert K. Hilder
Respondents.
This matter came before the Court on the Petition for Extraordinary Relief and
respondents' Motion for Summary Judgment thereon. Petitioner filed additional motions
to which respondents submitted a response. The Court having considered all pleadings
on file, hereby rules as follows.
BACKGROUND
The Court has dismissed one of petitioner's claims as frivolous and ordered
respondent to address the merits of petitioner's other four claims. Respondent filed a
Motion for Summary Judgment asking the Court for summary judgment on those
remaining claims. Petitioner asks the court to strike the State's motion as untimely and
to stay the notice to submit for decision to allow him to file an interlocutory appeal on the
timeliness of the State's motion. The Court having reviewed the pleadings and all
documents on file, hereby finds and rules as follows.

UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS
1.

Petitioner pled guilty to two felony counts, one of Aggravated Sexual

Abuse of a Child and one of Sexual Abuse of a Child, July 14, 2004. The Court, Judge
Lynn Payne, sentenced him to two concurrent, indeterminate sentences in the Utah
State Prison, of five years to life and one year to fifteen years. Judgment and Order of
Commitment. Case 031800339
2.

Petitioner received notice of his hearing and a copy of the Board's record

prior to his hearing. Transcript of Parole Hearing 3 - 4, and Petitioner's Signed
Acknowledgment of Receipt of File
3.

On July 26, 2007 petitioner appeared at and spoke on his behalf at a

parole hearing before the Board of Pardons (the Board). ]d.
4.

At the hearing, the Board considered evidence from petitioner as well as

petitioner's daughter/victim, jd.
4. On August 7, 2007, for good cause and after the hearing and review of
information, the Board made and issued a decision to schedule petitioner for a
subsequent parole hearing in June 2014 and ordered him to successfully complete a
Sex Offender Treatment Program before that rehearing. Aff. of Curtis Garner and Final
Decision of the Hearing Held on July 26. 2007.
5. The Board issued and delivered to petitioner its Rationale for Decision, dated
July 31, 2007. Rationale for Decision.
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6. In response to the Board's decision, petitioner submitted information and
received a Special Attention Review of this decision by the Board wherein the Board
ordered no change to the June 2014 date. Special Attention Review.
7. The Petition was filed November 10, 2008. Docket.
I.

Motion to Strike and Motion to Stay
Petitioner moves to strike respondent's motion as untimely, and claims the Court

mailed the petition to respondent April 24, 2009 and thus respondent's motion was due
June 3, 2009. Petitioner misreads the docket in this file and the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. The Court did not mail the contents of the file until May 11, 2009. See
Docket. Therefore according to Rules 6 (a) and (e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
respondent's motion was due June 15, 2009.1 The Court received respondent's motion
June 8, 2009, respondent's motion is therefore timely. The motion to strike and motion
to stay are therefore denied.
II.

Summary Judgment
Summary judgment "shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
a judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. Pro. 56(c). Summary judgment is
appropriate "when it clearly appears that there is no reasonable probability that the party
1

Thirty days after May 11, plus three days for service is June 15, 2009, not June 3rd nor June 8th.
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moved against could prevail." Snyder v. Merklev. 693 P.2d 64, 65 (1984). A trial court
does not weigh facts when considering a summary judgment motion, and only
determines whether a dispute of material fact exists. Pigs Gun Club. Inc. v. Sanppte
County. 2002 UT 17, If 24).
Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-5 is clear that "[decisions of the Board of Pardons in
cases involving paroles, pardons, commutations or terminations of sentence, restitution,
or remission of fines or forfeitures are final and are not subject to judicial review." Any
judicial review of the Board's decisions "is limited to the 'process by which the Board
undertakes its sentencing function.'" Preece v. House. 886 P.2d 508, 512 (Utah 1994)
(citing Lancaster v. Utah Bd. of Pardons, 869 P.2d 945, 947 (Utah 1994)). Unless there
has been, "a gross and flagrant abuse of discretion and fundamental principles of
fairness are flouted, [and] a court may, giving appropriate deference to legislative policy
and the extraordinarily difficult duties of the Board of Pardons, intervene to correct such
abuses by means of an appropriate extraordinary writ.'" State v. Barrett. 2005 UT 88, fl
21 (citing Renn v. Utah State Bd. of Pardons. 904 P.2d 677, 683-84 (Utah 1995)). The
Court finds that the undisputed facts show the Board followed proper procedure and did
not abuse its discretion nor did it impair petitioner's due process when it set petitioner's
rehearing date for June 2014.
The Court accepts petitioner's objection as sufficient to oppose respondent's
motion, however petitioner sets forth no material disputes of fact. "When, as here, the
-4-

moving party 'challenges an element of the nonmoving party's case on the basis that no
genuine issue of material fact exists, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to
present evidence that is sufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact" Gjustiv,
stPrlinn WentworttLCopa,, 2009 UT 2, fl 53.
Petitioner claims the hearing officer misstated his actual convictions and he was
not allowed to present information to correct that misstatement. First, any confusion by
the hearing officer is immaterial to whether the Board followed proper procedure or
abused its discretion. The undisputed facts establish that petitioner was provided proper
notice for the hearing and that the hearing was properly conducted. Petitioner may
certainly present documents at his parole hearing, and when notice is proper those
documents must be present at the hearing. I Itah R. Admin. Pro. R671-301-1. This rule
does not entitle petitioner to present documents challenging the underlying convictions
for which he is incarcerated. The hearing officer gave petitioner the opportunity to
present a certified copy of any judgment, and petitioner told the hearing officer that he
did not have it with him. Hiring Transcript, at 7-8. Further, the hearing officer is not the
ultimate decision maker, and his confusion, if any, is negated by the Board's ultimate
parole decision based on the full record. The Board made its decision and set forth its
rationale for the decision, and listed at least eight different reasons to support it. The
affidavit of Curtis Garner, Chairman of the Utah State Board of Pardons and Parole,
also makes clear that any confusion about the crimes at the hearing would have been
-5

rectified during the Board's actual consideration of the full record of petitioner's crimes.
Aff. of Curtis Garner, at H 8 -13 . The Board issued its rationale for decision citing
several different reasons for its decision. Further, it granted and reconsidered all the
evidence petitioner submitted in its Special Attention Review.
When the Board properly makes and supports the decision, it meets the
procedures, "[tjhe decision of the Board will be reached by a majority vote and reduced
to writing, including a rationale for the decision." Utah R. Admin Prn R671-305-1 see
also Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-5(1 )(a). The hearing officer only makes a
recommendation and not a final decision. ]d. Petitioner's allegations that minor
confusion and his own failure to properly bring documents to the hearing compromised
the fairness of the hearing does not establish a genuine dispute of fact that the Board
properly followed procedures and did not abuse its discretion.
Petitioner's objection to the Board considering his pre-sentence report is also
unfounded. It is not for the Court to evaluate the content of this report, but only to affirm
that the pre-sentence report constitutes a portion of petitioner's record and is a fair basis
from which to glean information about petitioner. Further, the pre-sentence report is
Finally, the Court rejects petitioner's objection to the Board considering evidence
and testimony from his victim at the hearing. A victim "may attend any hearing regarding
the offender. A victim may testify during any hearing regarding the impact of the
offense(s) upon the victim, and may present his views concerning any decision to be
-6-

made regarding the offender." Utah R. of Admin. Pro. R671-203-3; and see Utah Code
Ann. § 77-27-9.5 (4) (a) - (c) (authorizing the same). It was entirely proper for the Board
to allow petitioner's victim to speak at his parole hearing.
Petitioner has not presented evidence or material facts that the Board exceeded
its discretion nor that the Board committed any gross or flagrant abuse of power.
Based on the foregoing, respondents' motion for summary judgment is hereby
GRANTED. This is the final Order of the Court no further Order is required.

DATED this

/*-

day of August 2009.

T

DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
?v n >

I

MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Ruling and
Order, to the following, this _±_ day ofltiy72009:

iVuji^
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
APPEALED: CASE #20090720
GARY L WELBORN vs. CURTIS GARNER
CASE NUMBER 080923667 Post Conv Rel NonCap

CURRENT ASSIGNED JUDGE
ROYAL I HANSEN
PARTIES
Petitioner - GARY L WELBORN
Respondent - CURTIS GARNER
Respondent - KEITH HAMILTON
Respondent - CHERYLN HANSON
Respondent - CLARK HARMS
Respondent - JESSE GALLEGOS
Respondent -

MEMBERS OF THE UTAH BOARD OF P

ACCOUNT SUMMARY
TOTAL REVENUE

Amount Due:
Amount Paid:
Credit:
Balance:

REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COMPLAINT
Amount Due:
Amount Paid:
Amount Credit:
Balance:

155 .00
155 .00
0 .00
0..00
NO AMT S
155..00
155.,00
0.,00
0.,00

CASE NOTE

PROCEEDINGS
11-10-08 Filed: PETITION FOR WRIT OF EXTRAORDINARY RELIEF, MANDAMUS
(VERIFIED)
11-10-08 Filed: Complaint
11-12-08 Judge SHEILA K MCCLEVE assigned.
11-12-08 Note: Case referred to Judge McCleve.
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11-17-08 Filed: Copy of Letter to Inmate Accounting Office requesting
plaintiff's accounting.
12-04-08 Filed: Account Statement
12-30-08 Filed: Determination of Requirement to Pay Filing Fees
returned. Address corrected and resent to Petitioner.
01-08-09 Filed: Complaint
No Amount
01-08-09 Fee Account created
Total Due:
155.00
01-08-09 COMPLAINT - NO AMT S
Payment Received:
155.00
Note: Code Description: COMPLAINT - NO AMT S, Mail
Payment;
03-19-09 Filed: Letter from defendant
04-20-09 Filed: Pro se motion to waive bon on undertaking
Filed by: WELBORN, GARY L
04-24-09 Filed order: Minute Entry
Judge SHEILA K MCCLEVE
Signed April 21, 2009
04-24-09 Filed: Motion for Appointment of Counsel
Filed by: WELBORN, GARY L
04-30-09 Filed: Letter from Petitioner requesting copy of docket . Clerk
mailed copy to defendant 4/28/09.
05-11-09 Filed order: Minute Entry
Judge SHEILA K MCCLEVE
Signed May 08, 2009
05-11-09 Note: Copy of contents of entire filed mailed to AG's office
06-08-09 Filed: Motion for summary judgment
06-08-09 Filed: Respondent's memorandum of points and authorities in
support of their motion for summary judgment
06-15-09 Filed: Pro se motion for summary judgement in favor of the
petitioner
06-25-09 Filed: Motion for 20 day Extension of Time
06-30-09 Filed order: minute entry
Judge SHEILA K MCCLEVE
Signed June 30, 2009
07-15-09 Filed: Motion m Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment and Motion to Strike
Filed by: WELBORN, GARY L
07-16-09 Filed: Respondents' reply memorandum
07-16-09 Filed: memorandum in opposition to petitioner's motion to
strike
07-16-09 Filed: request to submit for decision
07-16-09 Filed: motion for order allowing petitioner to respond to state
response date
07-29-09 Filed: Motion for order allowing petitioner to respond to
states response dated 7-16-2009 and order staying states notice
to submit for decision
07-30-09 Filed: Response to State's Response on Petitioner's Motion to
Strike and Request to Stay State's Notice to Submit for
Decision
07-30-09 Filed: Respondents' Objection to Petitioner's Motion to Allow a
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Response
08-11-09 Filed: Motion for judicial Notice
08-11-09 Filed order: ORder on motion for summary judgment
Judge ROBERT K HILDER
Signed August 10, 2009
08--28--09 Filed : Notice of Appeal
08- -28--09 Note: Cert/Copy of Notice of Appeal Forwarded to Utah Court of
Appealis
09--16--09 Filed : Letter from Supreme Court to Mr. \rtelborn regarding
notice of appeal filed and assigned case 20090720
09--16--09 Note: Appealed: Case #20090720
11--17--09 Note: Record indexed. Cert/copy of i.ndex sent to Crystal @ COA
20090720
01--03--10 Judge TIMOTHY R. HANSON assigned.
01--05--10 Judge ROYAL I HANSEN assigned.
02--09--10 Note: Record Checked out to the AG's; off;
ice Files 1 Paginat ed
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